Journal of Economic Literature
Book Reviews
2026-08-28
Michael Ostrovsky of Stanford University reviews “Combinatorial Auctions” by Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg,. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins “Twenty-three papers examine combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science. Papers discuss Vickrey auctions; iterative combinatorial auctions; ascending proxy auctions; simultaneous ascending auctions; the clock-proxy auction--a practical combinatorial auction design; PAUSE--a computationally tractable combinatorial auction; pseudonymous bidding in combinatorial auctions; from the assignment model to combinatorial auctions; bidding languages for combinatorial auctions; preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions; the communication requirements of combinatorial allocation problems; the winner determination problem; tractable cases of the winner determination problem; optimal winner determination algorithms; incentive compatibility in computationally feasible combinatorial auctions; noncomputational approaches to mitigating computational problems in combinatorial auctions; observations and near-direct implementations of the ascending proxy auction; a test suite for combinatorial auctions; empirical hardness models for combinatorial auctions; auctions for the safe, efficient, and equitable allocation of airspace system resources; combinatorial auctions for truckload transportation; auctioning bus routes and the London experience; and industrial procurement auctions. Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Shoham is Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University. Steinberg is Reader in Operations Management at the University of Cambridge. Glossary; author and subject indexes.”