Choosing between Alternative Concepts in a Worrisome World: Concern as a Criterion
2026-07-01
This article addresses a central challenge in political science: how to choose between competing conceptions and structures of concepts. Existing approaches to concept validity offer useful criteria—such as resonance, consistency, differentiation, causal utility, and operationalization—but tend to omit criteria for evaluating the normative considerations that often underpin conceptual choices. As a result, conceptualization may face a fundamental indeterminacy when multiple conceptions appear equally well grounded. To address this lacuna, I introduce a “concern” criterion, which evaluates concepts according to the extent to which they capture what is most worrisome in the political world. Building on the semantic–pragmatic approach to conceptualization, I argue that normative considerations can be disciplined, rather than avoided. The argument is illustrated through the case of political polarization, where a shift from issue-based to affect-based conceptions reflects changing concerns about political division. I also examine the implications of the concern criterion for structuring multidimensional concepts and address objections concerning objectivity, stability, and legitimacy. A concern criterion, although not sufficient on its own, provides a valuable complement to existing criteria and helps ground conceptual choices in a normatively informed yet methodologically disciplined manner.