International Anti-Corruption Commissions: Explaining Institutional Design and Autonomy
2026-01-24
Political corruption is a leading governance challenge, yet governments often lack the will to tackle it and may use anti-corruption to undermine democracy. This dilemma has given rise to international anti-corruption commissions (IACCs), which rely on partnerships between international experts and domestic personnel. Why are some IACCs granted independence, while others are politically subordinate? Focusing on northern Central America, this article argues that where coalitions comprised of government insiders and domestic activists maintain a seat at the negotiating table, they use their agenda-setting capacities, expertise, and ability to raise the audience costs of incumbent maneuvers to dilute anti-corruption to ensure greater IACC independence. Additionally, struggles over IACC autonomy are influenced by transnational dynamics, as political leaders learn from one another how to limit anti-corruption enforcement.