The geography of justice: neighborhood dynamics of war crimes trials
2026-03-21
Do attempts at accountability for war crimes in one state affect government behavior in another? A growing scholarship addresses the deterrence potential of human rights prosecutions. We examine whether deterrence extends beyond state borders, and why. We develop a theory of “neighborhood trials”—criminal proceedings against defendants in geographically and socially proximate states—and leaders’ wartime behavior. We find that whereas a trial conducted in a neighboring state’s domestic judiciary predicts reduced civilian killings in an ongoing conflict, an international neighborhood trial increases, rather than deters, violence. We adjudicate causal mechanisms with new fine-grained data on the International Criminal Court’s activities. Early-stage interventions in the neighborhood may reinforce the image of a toothless court, emboldening observing leaders. Our findings suggest that although trials may deter local violence, their cross-border effects are contingent. The study informs broader research on the diffusion of state practices, transitional justice, and backlash against international institutions.