Journal of Theoretical Politics
The politics of self-imposed term limits
2026-07-27
This article examines how self-imposed term limits—pledges made by candidates, should they be elected, not to seek reelection—can arise endogenously within a model of electoral accountability. To this end, I extend a standard model with adverse selection by introducing an election stage during which two candidates may voluntarily pledge to forgo reelection. I first show that such pledges can occur in equilibrium even without credible commitment power, highlighting their connection to cheap talk. I then analyze, at a high level of generality, equilibria when candidates can credibly commit to such pledges. In this scenario, self-imposed term limits allow strong candidates to signal their type and commit to making policy choices free from career distortions, thereby gaining an electoral advantage over reelection-seeking candidates. Finally, in a model specification in which politicians have heterogeneous policy preferences, I identify conditions under which term limit pledges are both informative and welfare-improving.