Who Shows Up? Legislative Attendance by Electoral Seat Type in Bangladesh and Pakistan
2025-12-15
Institutional mechanisms, like reserved seats, aim to enhance representation for underrepresented groups, including women and minorities. Yet little is known about whether legislators elected through these seats engage in legislative work at comparable levels to their peers elected through general seats. We examine legislative attendance—an observable form of engagement—in Bangladesh and Pakistan, two hybrid regimes with Westminster‐derived institutions. Drawing on theories of electoral incentives, institutional weakness, and competing principals, we argue that reserved‐seat legislators seek visibility during sessions to build reputations. Lacking independent electoral mandates and relying on party elites for nomination, they demonstrate loyalty and diligence through observable participation. Using an original dataset of attendance records and elite interviews, we find that reserved‐seat legislators attend plenary sessions more often than general‐seat legislators, even after controlling for demographic and institutional factors. These findings suggest that reserved seats, often criticized as symbolic, can generate strong incentives for visible participation. This study highlights how institutional pathways influence legislative behavior and contribute to comparative research on representation in non‐Western contexts.