Who supports martial law in a democracy? Lessons from South Korea
2026-07-29
On 3 December 2024, South Korea experienced an unprecedented political crisis when the president declared martial law. While the declaration was rapidly reversed and condemned by key democratic institutions, public opinion did not converge on rejection. Instead, support for—and tolerance of—the measure persisted among a nontrivial share of citizens. Why, in a democracy with functioning institutions, are some citizens willing to accept extraordinary executive measures? Using original nationwide survey data, this research shows that public support for martial law is strongly associated with affective polarization. Individuals who express strong partisan and leader-based affective alignment with the incumbent are significantly more likely to accept martial law, while those polarized in the opposite direction overwhelmingly reject it. The findings suggest that affective polarization can align evaluations of executive overreach with partisan loyalties, weakening normative constraints even in consolidated democracies where institutional safeguards continue to function effectively.