Journal of Economic Theory

Economics

The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory. It is the most general-interest journal among those specializing in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. The Journal strives to respond in four months from receipt of the manuscript. It is committed to maintaining a fair and balanced view of different fields in economic theory, with an emphasis on innovative work. Submissions with significant empirical, experimental, quantitative, and computational contributions are welcome, provided they are firmly grounded in theory. Themes include, but are not limited to, mechanism design, information, finance, matching, decision theory, game theory, political economy, market design, macroeconomics and monetary economics.

1. Matching and Price Competition in Large Markets 2026-09-06
2. Optimal Stopping under Volatility Ambiguity 2026-08-26
3. When Is the Trend the Cycle? 2026-08-26
4. Editorial Board 2026-08-25
5. Temporary exclusion in repeated contests 2026-08-24
6. The comparative statics of dominance 2026-08-20
7. Intergenerational Cultural Transmission with Social Interactions as An Evolutionary Game 2026-08-19
8. Value of Information in Social Learning 2026-08-17
9. The Isolation index and variations on relative exposure 2026-08-13
10. local non-bossiness 2026-08-12
11. A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring 2026-07-28
12. Government Trading and Efficiency in Imperfectly Competitive Financial Markets 2026-07-18
13. Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules 2026-07-16
14. On Preference for Simplicity and Probability Weighting 2026-07-15
15. When Can Less Be More? Inducing Dealer Responses in RFQ Platforms 2026-07-15
16. Recursive Preferences and Ambiguity Attitudes 2026-07-14
17. Informational Inertia and the Taylor Principle 2026-07-13
18. On the Efficiency of Runnable Banking Arrangements 2026-07-04
19. When Lasry-Lions meet Krugman: A mean-field game theory of spatial dynamics 2026-06-18
20. Robustly Optimal Voting Rule 2026-06-16
21. Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism 2026-06-15
22. Time Use and Heterogeneous Markups 2026-06-14
23. Editorial Board 2026-06-12
24. Classical Matching via Network Formation 2026-06-12
25. Investment Sophistication and Wealth Inequality 2026-06-10
26. Hold-up in the Absence of Individual Rationality: Asymptotic Efficiency and Gradualism 2026-06-04
27. Which Experiments Test a Model? 2026-06-01
28. Expectation and Confusion: Evidence and Theory 2026-05-26
29. Reference-dependent choice bracketing 2026-05-26
30. The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments 2026-05-22
31. The Hard Problem and the Tyranny of the Losers 2026-05-22
32. Learning Through Imitation: An Experiment 2026-05-21
33. Credit, Money and (Pseudo-)Anonymity 2026-05-19
34. Editorial Board 2026-05-13
35. Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals 2026-05-09
36. Credit Rationing in Unsecured Debt Markets 2026-05-09
37. The VCG Mechanism, the Core, and Assignment Stages in Auctions 2026-05-09
38. Positive and Negative Selection in Bargaining 2026-05-09
39. Asymmetric Optimal Auction Design with Loss-Averse Bidders 2026-05-07
40. Information Design with Endogenous State Verification 2026-05-05
41. Localized Perfection 2026-05-02
42. Meta-preference, endogenous preference formation and dynamic choice 2026-05-01
43. Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828] 2026-04-23
44. Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields 2026-04-20
45. Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered 2026-04-19
46. Cautiousness when experts disagree 2026-04-18
47. Covert learning and disclosure 2026-04-16
48. Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules 2026-04-09
49. Editorial Board 2026-04-09
50. Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting 2026-04-07